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THE question of the relief of the Supreme Court of the United
States has been much discussed for a few years and has excited not
a little interest. The accumulation of old cases hanging on from
term to term, and growing greater annually in number from the
inability of the court even to dispose of the new cases yearly reaching them, shows plainly that, for the benefit of suitors, even more
than for the relief of the judges, some change is imperatively
demanded. This is doubtless a fact in the problem which few will
question-something must be done. But, when we come down to
the means of attaining the end, the question becomes much more
difficult. When the American Bar Association discussed the subject at Saratoga in 1882, it appeared that irreconcilable differences
existed, not only in the committee, which had been appointed to
consider the subject, but in the body itself as well; and the resolution recommending the plan of a Court of Appeals was only carried
by 39 votes to 27. The question has been the subject of much
discussion since then in different parts of the country, and there
have been introduced into Congress more than a dozen bills, many
of them radically differing from each other. In the midst of such
great variety of opinion, it is entirely impossible to say what will
be the outcome of the matter, though it may be presumed from the
interest manifested that, within a few years at most, some important
legislation on the subject will be passed.
The plans, which appear to receive the most support are, (1) the
establishment of a Court of Appeals, wherein shall be finally
decided many of the cases which now reach the Supreme Court,
and (2) the division of the court into sections which shall sit
separately, the decisions in all cases to be rendered by the whole
court. The first-named or Davis plan seems to meet with most
favor, and its features occur more or less markedly in several of
the pending bills. The very serious objection that it would far
from conduce to uniformity of decision has been met by other bills
embodying a part of its plan.
It is not our purpose, however, to enter into any elaborate
examination of the different bills I before Congress, for we are
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unable to see that any such great change in the matter is needed,
as is generally advocated. We think it can be shown that, by
repealing a few bf the acts giving jurisdiction to the Federal courts
in certain specified classes of cases, it can be made easy for them to
dispose of their whole annual accession and in the course of some
years to bring the lists again down to a condition where they can
be cleared up each year. If this is possible, without depriving
suitors of rights which they ought to have, we assume that it is
desirable. There can be no question that, by itself alone, the
creation of a new court is not to be wished. The expense of the
body is a fair argument against it, unless it is a real necessity; and,
more than that, it is certainly the case, and it seems to be conceded,
that the present constitution of the Federal courts, is preferable to
the proposed new one, with a Court of Appeals intermediate for some
cases. One of the main objects to be attained is the avoidance of
those great delays, .which are a practical denial of justice in many
cases; and it should not be forgotten that, whatever plan for the
Court of Appeals might be fixed on, some, at least, of the cases
would have to drag their weary length through both the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, before the unhappy suitors would
at length be released.. This is not desirable. The present plan,
if it can do the work, is certainly preferable, and thus much, we
believe, is admitted on all sides.
The growth of the federal judicial business was for many years
very gradual, the cases on the lists of the Supreme Court being
decidedly few in number until the middle of the century; not until
1858 did they even reach 300, and in 1870 for the first time they
exceeded 600. In 1875 there were 974 cases on their list, in 1876
1000, in 1880 1202, in 1881 1013, in 1882 1026, and in 1883
1070.. The total average annual accession for the last ten years has
been about 425 cases, the new cases docketed to October 1881,
numbering 399; to October 1882, 422, and to October 1883, 419.1
'This last number is subject to slight variation, "as there may be four or five
cases docketed to-day (May 3d) and Monday, which will increase the number for
1883." Our facts in relation to the condition of the docket, as well as to the
number of cases decided per annum are taken from the report of the Committee of
the American Bar Association (Vol. 5, p. 344-364), and from information kindly
furnished by Mr. McKenney, the clerk of the Supreme Court. There is some discrepancy between the two sources of information as to the total number of cases on
the list, which we cannot explain. All our information in regard to the years
1881-2-3 is taken directly from Mr. McKenney's figures, and we presume there can
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The number of cases annually disposed of varies of course not a
little, but it averages 360.
It is therefore clear that their business
has grown unmanageable, only within the last fifteen years, and it is
further clear that the great number of cases on their docket is liable
to be not a little misleading ; the vast majority of these cases are
remanets, reaching back not a few years. The average annual
accession exceeds the number of cases they are able to dispose of
by about sixty-five (a very little over eighteen per cent.). This
increase of business is owing to different causes, but there is one
which stands out specially prominent. Judge STRONG (North

Amer. Rev. cxxxii., p. 438) pointed out the causes at length in his
article written shortly after he left the bench, and the same subject
has been recently examined more elaborately by a Committee of
the Law Association of Philadelphia.'
They found that over onethird (34.5 per cent.) of all the cases found their way to the
Supreme Court exclusively on the ground of citizenship, and they
be no doubt of their correctness. We have not felt called upon to endeavor to
explain the difference, as the two sources of information virtually agree as to the
point with which we are particularly concerned-the number of new cases coming
up to the court per annum.
I These gentlemen examined seven volumes of the reports (vols. 99-105 inclusive),
and found that the cases wvere as follows:
Cases from territorial courts .......................... 30
"
" the Court of Claims ...................... 43
"
" state courts ..............................
90
44
"1 Supreme Court of District of Columbia ...... 38
i
by or against national banks .................... 35
Patent and copyright cases ............................ 49
Land grant ............. .......................... 10
Admiralty .......................................... 29
Tax cases and cases against United States officers ........ 43
Bankruptcy cases .................................... 20
Cases in which the United States was a party ............ 31
C involving the construction of laws or treaties of the
United States ...................................
8
Cases in which the jurisdiction of the circuit court was
acquired by citizenship only .................... 66
Cases in which the ground of jurisdiction does not appear,
but presumably it was, almost without exception, citizenship ......................................... 147
739
They then assume that 100 out of the 147 cases under the 'last item depended
entirely upon citizenship; there can be no doubt that this assumption is in reality
considerably within the mark.
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at once saw that here was an opportunity for reduction. Others
also have seen the same thing, and several of the pending bills
propose a reduction by closing a part of this avenue. But cannot
more be done ? Why not cut off the whole of this branch ofrdursdiction at once, and thereby relieve the court from 34 per cent.
of its laborsP This would at once put them on their feet again,
and enabte them to do more than dispose of the annual accession
of new cases, for we have already shown that a relief of slightly
more than 18 per cent. is all that is imperatively demanded.
Judge STRONG has considered the expediency of more or less
radically altering the classes of 6ases to be decided by the Supreme
Court, and he lays special stress (ubi supra, p. 446-47) upon the
difficulty and comparative want of importance of citizenship cases.
The idea of abolishing the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in such
cases was thrown out by Mr. Hammond of the House Judiciary
Committee (see Phila. Legal Intell., April 11, 1884, p. 144-45,
where the proceedings of that cofimittee on April 1st are reported),
and it appears to have been concurred in by Mr. Reed of Philadelphia,
who was before that committee to advocate certain measures, and to
have met more or less approval from Mr. Cijiberson. Why should it
not be done, and the whole problem be thereby solved at once and
for many years?
It has been suggested, we believe, that it would be unconstitutional, but this can hardly be contended. The provision of
the constitution certainly does not, proprio vigore, vest the full
extent of the Federal judicial power in the courts which Congress may establish, and confer upon them power to exercise it
without legislative regulations. It cannot have this meaning, for
an unanswerable question would-be, which of the inferior courts is
to exercise the jurisdiction, and under what regulations ? Though
the judicial power does extend to controversies between citizens of
different states, yet Congress need not call it into being, just as it
need not pass a bankrupt law, declare war, or execute other powers
conferred by the constitution. And it is a well-known fact that,
for over eighty-five years, Congress exercised but little comparatively of its power in conferring jurisdiction in citizenship
cases, and this was never held to be unconstitutional.
It is, therefore, apparent that more than one-third,1 of the cases
I Judge STRONG, Id. p. 447, says that stopping citizenship and alien cases at an
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reaching the Supreme Court can be cut off by this simple process,
and there are strong reasons why it should be done, and we, at least,
fail to see any valid argument against it. This class of cases is one
that gives special and peculiar trouble to the court, owing to the
fact that it calls upon them to examine so many systems of law.
The lawyer who has more than a faint acquaintance with the law
of two or three states is not onfly a man of learning, but must have
been endowed with a most rich measure of that precious giftmemory. The most learned of us is in reality not competent alone
to undertake and conduct a law proceeding in a state where he is
not at home. He may have the theory perfect and at his fingers'
ends, but some wretched little point, which the lawyer of the locus
would be entirely familiar with, will miss him, and he will soon be
in a snarl. So difficult is it that at least some lawyers decline the
practice entirely. Yet the Supreme Court is called upon to
examine into the law of no less than forty-seven different jurisdictions other than that properly of the United States. The difficulty
of this must be enormous and hardly capable of exaggeration; we
all experience trouble enough in settling the law of one jurisdiction.
Probably, the judge arises from the argument of a case of this
nature, after the conflicting and not always precisely accurate
statements of the law by counsel, with but the vaguest knowledge
of what the law really is. He has, then, subsequently, to spend
laborious hours in searching through statutes and law reports which
are new to him ; and, in this labor, a portion at least of the usual
incentive.is wanting, for he is notworking in his own field, nor is
he spurred on by the knowledge that his work will be of daily use
to him in the future. (See Judge STRONG'S article, Id. p. 440-46,
where the difficulty in this class of cases is specially emphasized.)
Then, there is this additional trouble that, as the Supreme Court
does not universally, in cases of this nature, follow the law of the
state, their labor is not at an end when they have discovered the
latest state decision upon the subject; but they must make an
elaborate examination and decide whether there has been a conflict
of decision in the state upon the subject, and what was the law at
the date the plaintiff acquired his rights; and, then, finally,
whether, on the whole case, it is one where, under their own
intermediate court would relieve the Supreme Court of " at least one-half" of its
cases. As there are but few alien cases, his estimate of citizenship cases is evidently
larger than that which we borrow,, but we do not know on what it is based.
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decisions upon this very difficult subject, they will feel obliged to
adhere to the latest state decision or will decline to follow it.
We -think these facts show that the jurisdiction depending
exclusively on citizenship involves great and peculiar trouble, and
it would seem, therefore, that the decision of a hundred such cases
must demand not a little more time and labor than does an average
hundred cases of strictly Federal law. Therefore, as the citizenship cases constitute slightly more than a third of all their cases,
we should, by abolishing root and branch this source of jurisdiction, reduce their labor considerably more than a third. This is a
vast reduction, and the only question that remains is the advisability of the step. Is there any reason to-day for the court's being
troubled with this mass of cases which do not belong to the system
of jurisprudence which it is their fufiction to erect? We cannot
see that there is. The reason for the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction in such cases is well known and was doubtless a hundred years ago a very valid one, but it would sedm. to have no vital
force any longer. At the time the provision was adopted, we were
emerging from a condition in which each state had been actively
engaged in erecting its own walls of restrictions, with the view of
helping itself and injuring its neighbors, and there is no doubt that
there were strong feelings of jealousy and distrust among the
different states of the confederation. This condition of affairs was
the very reason for the making and adoption of the constitution,
and it is highly natural, therefore, that it contained the provision.
There would likely, otherwise, have been frequent bickerings and
discontents about verdicts and decisions going against citizens suing
in states where they did not live, afid one of the very purposes of the
constitution would have been frustrated for a time. But the course
of nearly one hundred years has changed all this. It is hackneyed
now to speak of the nearness of all parts of the country to each
other and of the closeness with which we are bound together in all
the affairs of daily life, but it is only the more true, because hackneyed. It is undoubtedly the case that San Francisco is effectively
as near us to-day as Boston was to Richmond a hundred years ago.
The New Yorker is vastly better acquainted to-day with the
Chicagoan than he then was with the man from New Haveni.
We are all closer together in point of mere time, and in other
matters our closeness to each other is even greater. And this constant intercourse and knitting of interests has had that effect Which
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was to be expected. We have become better friends, more similar
in manners and customs, more willing to trust each other, and we
do not now look with staring eyes at the citizen of another state as
he passes us in the street or we deal with him. On the contrary,
we daily see and deal with many of them, without even knowing it,
or caring, if we do. It may fairly be said that that prejudice,
which was the causb of the constitutional provision, is a thing of
the past. If it was then, it is no longer, the case that a citizen of
any state need fear that he will fail of receiving a fair trial, let his
suit be in what state you please. We must not forget that, in the
federal as well as the state court, he will meet with a jury of
citizens of another state than his ; and, if the change proposed is
made, the only difference will be that he will have his trial presided
ovr by a judge, who is also a citizen of another state than he,
which may, possibly, not be the case, when he has the right to sue
in the federal courts. We should be loath to believe that this
would put the party from a distance in any peril of not getting an
impartial trial, nor do we think there is any evidence whatsoever
that such would be the case.
If we are right as to the question of prejudice, there is certainly
no valid reason why the jurisdiction should not be abolished. If it
is said that their jurisdiction is necessary in such cases on account
of questions of commercial law, the answer is plain that by far the
greater number of such cases-and often growing out of a transaction
identically the same as that which it is argued the federal courts
should decide-must inevitably be subject exclusively to the courts
of the state; and that system sadly lacks uniformity, which holds
a defendant not liable on one contract and yet liable on another,
when the sole difference between the first and the second is that the
parties to the second are entitled to sue in the federal courts. And
in the vast majority of such cases, the federal courts are, by
universal admission, called upon, merely owing to adventitious
circumstances, to administer the law of another forum. It is
certain that they cannot exercise this function any better than the
courts of the state, whose very breath of life is the law in question.
As to the comparatively few cases of this nature, in which they
decline to follow the law of the state as expounded by her tribunals,
it is submitted that their soundness, as also their expediency, are
matters of grave doubt. This line of decision has given rise to
another great element of uncertainty as to party's rights -as well
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citizens as non-citizens of the state-and has unquestionably not
attained any such degree of definiteness as enables counsel to
advise on the subject. The decisions are undoubtedly very conflicting, the question is one of the greatest difficulty and obscurity
in itself, and the court has not succeeded in elaborating any system
out of it, which offers a reasonable prospect of a scientific basis.1
We think, therefore, that even those who support this class of decisions, must feel that their importance is not sufficiently great to
render it worth while to yield up the great prospect offered of relieving the court without the creation of new courts and complicated
machinery. It is apparent that this one change will make such a
reduction that there would probably be no necessity for several
decades, at least, to erect a new court, and he is an unwise physician
who applies radical remedies before there is an imperious necessity.
The country is certainly growing with tremendous strides, and it is
likely that litigation will increase with the growth of population,
but we can by no means say that it will grow in anything like the
same proportion; and, if one simple remedy can enable the court
at its present rate to dispose of considerably more than the annual
accession, it is surely not advisable to apply such heroic remedies
as are advocated. The future is so uncertain that it is not best to
make great changes, when a small one will remedy the present
evil. Let us rather provide for our present heeds by simple
means, and not legislate in the dark for a condition of affairs,
which is, maybe, to exist several decades from the present time.
Who can say what effect the vast changes going on in our midst it)
monetary affairs and commercial relations will have upon the law
business of the country ? Who can say what will be the effect of
that tendency to. centralization of business, which is one of the
most striking features of the day, and which is but beginning to
have its effect ? Where, in the past, a thousand transactions were
performed by as many different people, they are often now performed in an hour or two by one individual or officer of a corporation. And, whatever we may think of the corporations and
their modes of doing business in certain aspects, there can be no
doubt that, in the long run, there must be less litigation, growing
.1 See this subject reviewed at length by the writer in the Southern Law Review
for December 1882, p. 452 ; see also article by Mr. Henry Reed in Am. Law Rev.,
April 1875 ; and by Mr, William B. Hornblower, Am. Law Rev., xiv., p. 211.
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out of a given number of cases operated by one practised hand
than by the many. The one hand is soon far more skilful than
• is the average of the many, and is, moreover, likely to act under
the guidance of better legal advice than are the many. There can
be no doubt, we take it, that the tendency of companies for the
insurance of titles to real estate is greatly to lessen litigation on
that subject, and the same may be said of all bodies of a kindred
nature., Such bodies are daily springing up among us, and have
undoubtedly had a marked influence in some places in reducing
law business. Is it not to be presumed that they will continue to
increase in number and in the classes of subjects to which they
apply, and that they will spread over the whole country ? This is
not the place to go into these questions at length, and -we merely
cite them as elements on which we can put our hands, and which
we can see must have a marked operation as a set-off to the tendency to increase of judicial business from growth of population.
Others could be named, and there are probably a thousand similar
elements, which we cannot even see, let alone know their effects ;
and we submit again therefore, that it is not the part of a
wise statesman, in the midst of such uncertainty as to the future, to
advocate radical change, until the time arrives when it is apparent
that some fundamental measure is the only means of attaining the
needs of the then present.
Besides the citizenship cases, there is at least one other source
of jurisdiction, the necessity of which it is difficult to see. We
refer to cases from the District of Columbia. These reach the
Supreme Court in large numbers, constituting a little over five per
cent. of their total business. Their removal would therefore be a
marked relief, and a bill has been introduced into the Senate with
that view by Mr. Ingalls. It is not easy to see why the time of
the highest federal court should be wasted in deciding miserable
disputes growing out of contracts to pave the streets of Washington,
or to hear cases depending exclusively upon the old Maryland law,
whenever the sum in dispute exceeds $2500 and the defeated party
is of a litigious nature. The only desideratum would appear to be
that these cases should be decided by a competent tribunal under
the control of Congress, and with a revisory body. The Supreme
Court of the District certainly fills these requisites. The passage
of the Ingalls bill would therefore seem to be highly advisable.
Territorial cases involving more than $1000 constitute another
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class of cases, which seems to -us out of place in the Supreme
Court, though we speak with much diffidence on this subject, as no
bill has been introduced to cut off this source of cases, and as there
may be some controlling reason for the existence of the jurisdiction,
of which we are not aware. The territories must sooner or later
elaborate a system of law for themselves as states, and it would
probably be well for them to begin early and not to enter the Union
as states without an "unwritten law" based on law decisions of
their own. Of course, all questions growing out of their organic
law would necessarily reach the federal Supreme Court as involving
the meaning of a United States statute, but why questions upon
the law of negligence or of emblements and kindred subjects in a
territory, should be permitted to make a drain upon the time of the
Supreme Court, when that time is so imperatively needed for other
things, we are at a loss to see. The review they already have in
their own Supreme Courts, ought to be enough for their comparatively unimportant business. The cases from these courts constitute
* a little more than four per cent. of all the cases in the United
States Supreme Court, and it would, therefore, doubtless be quite
within bounds to assume that, if this branch were cut off, it would
make a reduction of two per cent.
The jurisdiction conferred upon the District Courts (and thence
*indirectly to the Supreme Court in error, when the matter in dispute exceeds 82000), by the fifteenth clause of sect. 563 of the
Revised Statutes of all suits by,or against national banks, also offers
an opportunity for reduction. There is no good reason why an
ordinary suit depending entirely on state law (e. g., a suit on
promissory note or upon mortgage) should take the time of the
federal courts, simply because a bank is a party ; and the jurisdiction in such cases could easily be taken away, leaving questions of
the interpretation of the charter or the powers of the corporation
under the United States laws to reach. the Supreme Court on other
well-known grounds. The cases by or against national banks constitute a little less than five per cent. (4.73), and this ground of
relief, it may therefore be assumed, would remove from one and a
half to two per cent. at least of the cases-another very material
reduction.
It is our desire entirely to avoid any quasi political question in
this article, but we ought at least to mention the legislation proposed in sects. 2, 3,4 and 6, of the bill introduced by Mr. TownVOL. XXXII.-47
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send, proposing the repeal of a part of the jurisdiction in civil
rights cases. This has in its favor at least the argument thaIt it
would afford relief, whatever may be said for or against it on other
grounds.
We think we have shown conclusively that the needed relief of
the court can be attained in the way proposed, without the creation
of any new court whatsoever, and without in any way damaging
either the court itself, the rights of suitors, or the interests of the
government ; and, surely, if this be so, it is immeasurably the
preferable mode. The measures proposed would enable the court
in the course of not very many years to dispose of all their arrearages, and, even if it is thought that those arrearages should be
cleared up more rapidly, it would be very easy to create a commission for that purpose. Such a body could be arranged upon the
plan of one of the pending bills, and all the cases now on the list,
which do not involve a question distinctively of federal law, be
referred to it for its final decision, with such other regulations as
might be thought best. But even this temporary new court does
not seem necessary or even expedient.
SuiARY: Number of new cases per annum 425; number 'of
cases decided per annum 860.
The relief of the court from the citizenship cases only would
reduce the new cases per annum to 279, and thereby enable them
to dispose of as many as 81 old cases each year; and the list would
not become unmanageable again, until the annual accession of cases
increases by from one-quarter to one-third.
Their relief from citizenship and District of Columbia cases
would reduce the new cases per annum to 258, and enable them to
dispose of 102 old cases each year; and the list would not become
unmanageable again, until the annual accession of cases increases
by from one-third to one half.
Their relief from citizenship, District of Columbia, national
bank and territory cases would reduce the new cases per annum to
243, and enable them to dispose of 117 old cases each year; and
the list would not become unmanageable again, until the annual
accession of cases increases by nearly one half.
WILLIAM M. MEIGS.
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